'A century has now gone by, yet the Gallipoli campaign of 1915-16 is still infamous as arguably the most ill conceived, badly led and pointless campaign of the entire First World War. The brainchild of Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, following Turkey's entry into the war on the German side, its ultimate objective was to capture the Gallipoli peninsula in western Turkey, thus allowing the Allies to take control of the eastern Mediterranean and increase pressure on the Central Powers to drain manpower from the vital Western Front.
'From the very beginning of the first landings, however, the campaign went awry, and countless casualties. The Allied commanders were ignorant of the terrain, and seriously underestimated the Turkish army which had been bolstered by their German allies. Thus the Allies found their campaign staled from the off and their troops hopelessly entrenched on the hillsides for long agonising months, through the burning summer and bitter winter, in appalling, dysentery-ridden conditions. By January 1916, the death toll stood at 21,000 British troops, 11,000 Australian and New Zealand, and 87,000 Turkish and the decision was made to withdraw, which in itself, ironically, was deemed to be a success.' (Publication summary from Allen & Unwin, 2015 edition)
'Gallipoli and the Armenian genocide began at the same time in the same country and continued for approximately the same period of time. Their respective historiographies have generally treated them as occurring in completely separate universes. However, some international scholars have recently suggested a substantive historical relationship between them. Yet only one Australian (popular) historian, Alan Moorehead in his Gallipoli written more than 60 years ago, has ever done so. This article retrieves his analysis of this link, contending that Moorehead reworked material from two American diplomats working in Constantinople in 1915. This tripartite thesis is examined for its feasibility, especially its focus on the failed Allied naval attack of 18 March as precipitating the Armenian massacres. It is then briefly contrasted with contemporary scholarship that has also acknowledged Gallipoli, albeit in different ways, as a factor in the Armenian catastrophe. Using both the early and later suggestions of this linkage as a starting point, I offer an outline of a possible interpretation of the Gallipoli–Armenian genocide nexus. This article is intended as an introductory approach to this question.' (Publication abstract)
'Gallipoli and the Armenian genocide began at the same time in the same country and continued for approximately the same period of time. Their respective historiographies have generally treated them as occurring in completely separate universes. However, some international scholars have recently suggested a substantive historical relationship between them. Yet only one Australian (popular) historian, Alan Moorehead in his Gallipoli written more than 60 years ago, has ever done so. This article retrieves his analysis of this link, contending that Moorehead reworked material from two American diplomats working in Constantinople in 1915. This tripartite thesis is examined for its feasibility, especially its focus on the failed Allied naval attack of 18 March as precipitating the Armenian massacres. It is then briefly contrasted with contemporary scholarship that has also acknowledged Gallipoli, albeit in different ways, as a factor in the Armenian catastrophe. Using both the early and later suggestions of this linkage as a starting point, I offer an outline of a possible interpretation of the Gallipoli–Armenian genocide nexus. This article is intended as an introductory approach to this question.' (Publication abstract)
